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An analysis of the governance policies of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) is 
undertaken in light of that institution’s drive to improve governance practices in the 
private sector. It turns out that the Commission itself does not practice many of the 
governance practices required and/or advocated for the corporate sector. Furthermore it is 
argued that governance policies necessary to resolve the principal – agent problem for the 
corporate sector are necessary to resolve that problem for a public sector regulator, but 
they are not sufficient. This is the result of the greater difficulty in monitoring the 
regulator because the objectives of the principals/electorate are more difficult to measure 
than profits, and those objectives are only loosely correlated with cash flows. The 
insistence on publicly available cost-benefit analyses for new and existing OSC 
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Pots and Kettles 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Good corporate governance practices have been much in the news because of both the 
recent corporate scandals in the U.S., and the collapse of the technology bubble. In the 
U.S, the apparent breakdown of corporate governance has led the SEC, Congress and 
some states to initiate new regulations and procedures to enforce their version of good 
governance on corporations listed on US exchanges. For whatever reason, Canadian 
regulators also appear ready to impose new regulations and laws in Canada along 
virtually the same lines as those in the U. S.1  
 
The practices that have come to light over the last five years have indeed been major 
violations of the principal – agent relationship between shareholders and the management 
of the principals’ firms: accounting standards have been violated (Enron and WorldCom); 
proper auditing procedures apparently have been bypassed (Enron and its auditor, 
Anderson); the absence of transparency and the toleration of conflict of interest seems to 
be rife in the industry with a notable case being the breaching of the supposed Chinese 
wall between sell side analysts and investment bankers. Finally, the outright looting of 
the firm by members of management seems to be at the heart of a number of cases 
(Tyco).    
 
Despite the fact that most managements are honest and keep the principals’ interests 
uppermost in carrying out their actions, the actions of those that have not has caused this 
rush to more intrusive and costly regulation. Even if these regulations will increase costs 
of operating the firm and reduce the welfare of most principals, regulators seem to 
believe that, despite this, the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. In particular, it is 
argued that something is needed to restore confidence to investors, and appearance 
matters almost as much as the effectiveness of the new regulations. Consequently all 
firms will be required to follow new rules instituted because of these rare, but 
spectacular, U.S. corporate scandals. 
 
Appearance may, indeed, be important in the United States where these scandals have 
occurred. It is more problematical in Canada, which has been relatively free of 
governance scandals despite darkly hinted rumors that they simply have not yet been 
exposed. Publicly traded Canadian firms may, in fact, have sufficiently good governance 
practices that new regulations on these practices simply impose greater costs on the 
private sector while conferring little, if any, benefit. If that is the case, then it may be 
useful to reexamine the role financial regulation is expected to play in society and 
especially reconsider the regulators’ own “governance structure” to determine whether or 
not  they are providing leadership through their own governance procedures,  or if there is 
more than a hint of hypocrisy in their admonitions. In this note I wish to do this and, in 
particular, apply some basic concepts of corporate governance to the primary regulatory 
body of security markets in Canada, namely the Ontario Securities Commission. While 
                                                 
C.f. OSC (2003a). 
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other financial regulators have similar governance issues, the OSC appears to be an 
extreme.2 
 
In assessing OSC governance, I consider two aspects: their formal governance structure 
and modifications that may be necessary for government agencies to meet the basic 
standards provided in the private sector. In the next section I provide a brief review of the 
principal – agent problem for government. Section 3 provides a review and critique of 
OSC governance since 1997 in meeting those requirements, as well as comparing their 
own practices with what they require of the private sector. In section 4 I examine 
alternative mechanisms that might improve governance practices and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The Government’s Principal – Agent Problem 
The principal-agent problem for the private sector is well known: the owner/principal 
delegates to a manager/agent the responsibility to provide some services for the principal. 
The problem is one of structuring contracts and institutions to insure that, in carrying out 
her duties, the agent acts in the principal’s interest rather than her own.  
 
Citizens of a country also face a principal – agent problem. Citizens “own” the machinery 
of government and employ bureaucrats to act as their agents in running this machinery. 
To reduce the costs of monitoring, the principals choose a legislature/board of directors to 
oversee the agents. Monitoring mechanisms are similar to those in the private sector: 
there are financial accounting standards that are met for each budgetary unit, and an 
external auditor checks these internal accounts. Transparency is maintained, in part, 
through freedom of information regulations. Compliance with procedures and other 
regulations are met both through internal monitoring and checks by units external to the 
bureau. Finally, contracts are structured, at least in a limited manner, to align the 
incentives for agents with those of the principals. 
 
There is, however, an additional problem in the public sector that does not exist for 
private firms.  The firm has a well defined objective function – the maximization of 
profits – whereas the apparent objective for the government is the maximization of some 
index of a (weighted) level of welfare of the electorate.  An unambiguous index of social 
welfare has been impossible to construct and, in its absence, monitoring the public sector 
is further complicated because data is generally lacking on whether or not the objective 
was actually approached and/or achieved and what the costs are that are linked to any 
specific objective. In effect, because of distribution issues and public goods, the cash 
flows measured with traditional accounting procedures will be, at best, only superficially 
correlated with that objective. Thus, looking at cash flows will provide the principals an 
extremely poor method of monitoring their public sector agents.  
 
Most governments are aware of this and, in some cases, have determined that traditional 
accounting systems must be augmented by some method of cost – benefit analysis. At 
least as far back as the 1960s Canada has tried to develop an operational method to 
                                                 
2  Cf. Chant and Mohindra (2001) or Mohindra (2002). 
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provide at least an approximate, quantifiable, measure for evaluating government 
programs.3 In essence, the use of cost-benefit analysis played an increasingly important 
role in providing such a method. However, while preprogram cost-benefit is fairly 
regularly used, the follow up of a post program assessment is rarely undertaken in any 
meaningful sense unless the Auditor General’s office decided to address the issue. 
 
Regulatory agencies, especially when structured as crown corporations, are potentially 
more difficult to provide legislative oversight. This is because these bodies often exist 
because the legislative branch believed that the policies were too complex and/or the area 
of operations too quickly changing to leave to the legislative process. In particular the 
financial regulator tends to have an objective that is broadly defined and allows the 
agency to determine for itself the specific elements necessary to achieve that objective. 
Furthermore, in many cases, the agency has the ability to set rates and generate revenue 
outside the budgetary process. Relative to other budgetary units this provides it even 
greater leeway from the oversight of the legislature. Nonetheless, it remains an agent for 
citizens of the state and if it is less directly monitored than other units then it is 
incumbent that it put governance practices in place to ensure that the principal – agent 
problem can be favorably resolved. Because the OSC is the Canadian agency most 
concerned about governance practices in the private sector, it is useful to examine that 
institution as an example of governance of a regulatory body. It is to this examination I 
now turn. 
 
3. OSC Governance Practices 
The Board 
Prior to 1997 the OSC was a part of the Ministry of Finance of Ontario. In that year they 
became a crown corporation. The corporation is composed of 9 commissioners plus the 
staff. The commissioners are the ones that set policy, and adjudicate cases brought before 
them by the OSC staff. The board of directors is also composed solely of the 
commissioners themselves. As such, they constitute the full membership of both the audit 
and the compensation committees.  
 
The nature of board membership of the OSC is in sharp contrast to recent requirements 
imposed on the private sector where the use of independent directors for private 
corporations has taken on special importance. It has been argued that these directors will 
better represent shareholders and keep management under control.4 Sarbanes –Oxley 
(SOX) requires a substantial proportion of directors be “independent”. In Canada, the 
OSC (2003a) has pushed strongly for independent audit committees arguing that it would 
increase the economic value added of those companies by between one and nine billion 
dollars. The argument is that, by having independent audit committees, boards would be 
less likely to put a better face on the results of the corporation. As a result, recent 
regulations require that all firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange require a majority 
of independent directors on the audit and compensation committees. Other publicly 
                                                 
3  See Sutherland (1990) for an assessment of Canadian developments in program 
budgeting. 
4  See OSC (2004) for governance practices proposed by the OSC. 
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traded corporations that have not met the independence requirements are required to 
report why they have not met the “voluntary regulations” on board membership.  
 
Because all commissioners are involved in both administrative and adjudication activities 
within the OSC, there is, at least in the context of the current debate, some question as to 
the quality of the leadership role the OSC is playing in demanding increased independent 
board membership for private corporations, Indeed, a similar argument can also be levied 
against the OSC. Because all audit committee members are involved in the operations of 
the Commission, from putting regulations in place to adjudicating, they have every 
incentive to place a favorable spin on the operation of their corporation. Perhaps 
fortunately, the bulk of the commissioners are lawyers who are acting as humble civil 
servants and thus would be fully forthcoming if there were any material errors in the 
financial accounts of the Commission. 
 
Despite the absence of external directors on the compensation committee, the OSC 
appears to believe they are also above reproach in deciding the compensation of other 
board members with similar responsibilities as themselves.5 On the other hand, a cynic 
could suggest that this represents a conflict of interest of the crudest type. Certainly, in 
the private sector, regulators have defined anyone who has worked in the firm within the 
last three years a non-independent director. An OSC commissioner who is currently 
involved in both policy initiatives and adjudication at the OSC is unlikely to meet the 
perception that they are independent. The actions of the compensation committee also do 
not lend much credence to that committee’s restraint in establishing salary levels. Prior to 
incorporation, civil service pay scales were in effect. With the founding of the 
corporation, such restrictions were removed and salaries surged. For instance, in 1997, 
only seven members of the OSC earned more than $100,000; by 2004, 137 were making 
that amount or more. More telling perhaps is that, using compensation consultants and 
the “independent” compensation committee, David Brown, the Commission head, 
received more than two and one half times as much as the head of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission.6  
 
Oversight  
Prior to incorporation, the OSC budget was determined by the legislature rather than from 
internally generated registration fees and fines. The 1997 enabling legislation freed them 
from this financial control of the legislature and they were free to set fee schedules as 
they saw fit. Any revenue generated that is over and above the cost of running the 
Commission is to be remitted to the general accounts of the provincial government. This 
                                                 
5  The “independence” of the Commission is presumably assured because only part time 
commissioners-who are involved in policy making and adjudicating-can be on this 
committee. 
6  See Chant and Mohindra (2001), p.34. This is not to say that the OSC chair is overpaid. 
Yet it is worth noting that Canadian financial regulators have been virtually the only 
group in the entire Canadian economy where the compensation is greater than their U. S. 
counterpart. 
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financial freedom has also significantly reduced the ability of the government to exercise 
oversight. 
 
What formal oversight that remains is in the domain of the Minister of Finance.7 The 
OSC must report to the minister at least once a year, indicating past undertakings and 
future priorities. The minister can require the Commission to address specific issues, 
reorder priorities, and the like.  Nonetheless, relative to other countries, there are 
surprisingly few venues where critical assessments of the securities regulator can be 
undertaken.8 In the US the SEC must report to legislative committees where there are 
members of both political parties. Australia and the UK both have strong oversight 
mechanisms. Even some smaller provinces have legislative committees composed of 
members of all parties that oversee crown corporations, including the securities regulator.  
Compared to those, the OSC Board can initiate a committee to assess the actions of the 
commission itself, but this committee reports directly to the Board and was last active in 
1988. The other venue appears to be the 5 year review where the recommendations go to 
the provincial Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs. 
 
Accounting 
Given the absence of any significant degree of oversight by the provincial government 
there are at least two other means of monitoring by the electorate. The first is to trust to 
the good offices of those in control of the Commission and pray they behave honorably. 
While this may well be adequate, it is hardly the response that the regulator itself would 
demand of a private sector corporation. Rather, the financial regulator would require that 
there be sufficient information – prospectus, quarterly reports, auditor’s reports, etc. – 
made available to allow the shareholders to make informed decisions and backed up by 
the force of law. In effect, the firm is required to have a degree of transparency and be 
vulnerable to lawsuit if information is misleading and/or incorrect. Requiring a similar 
level of transparency of the regulatory process is thus a second means to provide some 
oversight, and further, would be consistent with the OSC mandate in regulating private 
firms. 
 
The most essential element in providing the necessary transparency and reducing the 
costs of monitoring any institution is that there be some well defined set of rules with 
which to assess its performance, i.e., a method of accounting.  The OSC uses generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in assessing the financial flows through the 
organization, as well as providing an annual audit of the books. As indicated earlier, the 
problem for government agencies is that these accounts serve the private sector well but 
are seriously deficient for the purpose of evaluating government programs. For a 
government bureau or ministry, it is net benefits from mandated programs rather than 
profits that are the objective. While cost-benefit analysis is certainly not a panacea, - 
benefits and costs may well be ambiguous and/or poorly measured, - it does provide some 
method with which to assess programs and has therefore played an increasing role in the 
                                                 
7  See OSC (2003c).  
8  See Mohindra (2002) for an excellent comparison of oversight of financial regulators in 
Ontario, the US, the UK, Australia and Hong Kong. 
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conduct and evaluation of policy.9 Both the elected representatives and members of the 
public can then use these estimates to assess both the programs and their agents – both 
the members of the legislature and the civil servants – and can respond in their own best 
interest.10  
 
For a regular government bureau, those who ultimately assess and initiate the cost-benefit 
analysis of a program are elected representatives who have an incentive – reelection – to 
get things correct; for a regulatory agency such as the OSC the costs and benefits are 
evaluated by non-elected officials and the incentives to do the right thing are less 
powerful. Indeed, it can be argued that it is not in the regulator’s interest to provide 
transparent accounts of costs and benefits.  For instance, in the absence of accounts, it is a 
fairly simple matter for the agent to take credit for any positive outcomes and avoid 
blame for negative ones.11 Also, without transparency there is a tendency to formulate 
ambiguous regulations since such obfuscations limit the ability of outsiders to properly 
evaluate the regulator. In the case of the OSC, this absence of transparency is suggested 
by the charge of “acting against the public interest” which is only defined ex post if at all.   
 
Given the asymmetric information in conducting policies, what monitoring there is will 
be ineffectual without some accounting mechanism. Indeed, a major theme for financial 
regulation that the Crawford Commission12 identifies is that: 
 
 “Regulation should support clearly identified public policy objectives and be 
proportionate to the objective. The benefits of regulation (and changes to regulation) 
must outweigh the costs imposed by it.” 13 
 
The OSC has, in fact, been required to provide such an analysis under current legislation 
but the Crawford Commission notes that what the OSC has done is best described as 
“boilerplate”. For instance statements on costs and benefits often end with such 
generalities as “based on experience to date, the [Ontario Securities] Commission 
believes that the benefits of the proposed rule justify the costs”.14  This is qualitatively the 
same as a firm’s management telling its shareholders that everything it did was profitable 
– costs were less than revenue in every endeavor – but they didn’t keep any books to 
confirm that assertion. Such a firm simply could not be publicly traded in Ontario.  
 
                                                 
9  Presumably, legislative committees are there to obtain evidence on whether or not the 
costs outweigh the benefits or not, and the setting of a budget represents the 
government’s assessment where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs. 
10  Given a reasonably strong opposition (outside directors?), not only will the 
consequences of the program be transparent, but also there is a time honored method of 
penalizing an agent who does not act in the interest of the principals. 
11  See Chant and Acheson (1971) for an early application of this analysis to Canadian 
institutions. 
12   The Crawford Commission was instituted to provide a five year review of the OSC 
13  See OSC (2003b), p. 8. 
14  Ibid, p.81. 
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It is not that securities regulators are without the means to carry out such analysis. The 
Crawford Commission speaks favorably of the SEC’s use of cost – benefit analysis, and 
in soliciting others to assist it in identifying additional costs and/or benefits.15 One could 
go further. If the OSC is to lead by example, then, at a minimum, it should seriously face 
accounting rules that have both relevance and some public acceptance. By this I mean 
that it have economists, either in-house or under contract, that will undertake cost-benefit 
analyses on any new regulation, and that they systematically reexamine past regulations 
to see if they have remained profitable (have benefits that outweigh costs.) 
 
One of the most important aspects of transparency is that shareholders have access to the 
accounts of the firm. In the case of the OSC, the equivalent would, at a minimum, involve 
making public those cost-benefit analyses that are done and, as the Crawford 
Commission argues, also provide an explanation if they are not. Just as with the firm, this 
added level of potential monitoring should make the OSC more careful in undertaking 




Without a meaningful accounting system the issue of auditing – the use of an external 
supplier to assess the activities of the agent – is moot. Nonetheless, suppose that, 
following the Crawford Commission recommendation, the OSC does make an attempt to 
conduct cost-benefit analyses for any new policy initiative. Then an external audit would 
be as necessary here as it is in the private sector.  Certainly, the OSC would not tolerate a 
publicly traded firm that used only internal accountants to measure its profits and/or 
losses. Rather, it would require both an external audit and that some member of 
management be held to account if the books were found to be materially incorrect. The 
public should require no less of its regulatory agents. The “auditors” would thus be 
outside assessors with some competence in evaluating the programs and would most 
certainly be independent of the OSC itself. If “accounting frauds” are found, then it 
would be consistent with policy that someone in that organization would be held 
accountable and should bear the same consequences as if such fraud occurred in the 
private sector. For instance, recent regulatory changes in the U.S. and Canada require that 
the CEO and CFO sign off on quarterly reports, presumably because they can be 
prosecuted if there were any falsification of those statements. Perhaps the Chair and the 
chief economist of the OSC should be required to face similar actions if their cost-benefit 
studies also are materially incorrect.  
 
Compliance 
In the current regulatory environment even medium sized firms need to devote 
considerable resources to ensure that regulations affecting both principals and third 
parties are not compromised by members of the firm. Crown corporations, such as the 
OSC, have more limited liabilities due to their quasi judicial role, yet they too are subject 
to rules on process  and the like that also are meant to protect principals and third parties. 
                                                 
15  These have been used for regulations initiated by the SEC. In the case of Sarbanes – Oxley, the 
rules were initiated and passed by Congress without the benefit of any significant analysis of the 
costs and benefits of the legislation. 
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It is, no doubt, the case that the OSC has procedures in place to control for petty behavior 
directed at the public that deals with the Commissioners and/or staff such as arrogance, 
vindictiveness and/or conflict of interest practices, however unlikely.  Nonetheless, there 
appears to be a fundamental difference between how private firms and regulatory 
agencies ultimately ensure compliance. For the firm, the compliance officer can, and 
often is required to, go outside the firm – to the regulator or the courts – to report 
malfeasance. For the OSC, the “compliance officer” reports to the head of the agency 
itself. At a very minimum, this can lead to the appearance of conflicts of interest and 
cover-up. Because the OSC insists that appearance is virtually as important as actions, 
providing some external channel to report violations should lead to greater compliance in 
appearance as well as in fact. It would also show that the OSC is capable of leading by 
example. 
 
The Crawford Commission has also focused on a second area of compliance. This is the 
breaching of the presumed Chinese wall between staff and commission. This focus is 
fairly recent, appearing in the 2003 final report but not the draft report issued the year 
before. One possible reason for its appearance as an issue may be because of the quality 
of the quasi-judicial decisions that have been made since the market has fallen: on the 
basis of scanty evidence at best, the decisions made have had penalties far in excess of 
the costs of the apparent crimes committed, and substantial inconsistencies across parties 
of the same infraction.16 The separation of prosecutor and judges separated by one flight 
of stairs does not give many in the financial community much confidence in the justice of 
the system.17 One suggestion of the Crawford Commission was to explore the possibility 
of the separation of the prosecutorial and judicial branches. In effect, removing the 
adjudication function from the OSC provides at least some oversight of the institution by 
having the capacity to overturn decisions that would otherwise be conducted “in house”. 
This oversight could help restore some confidence in the decisions made by the OSC.  
 
4.  Additional Governance Mechanisms 
Government bureaus have had great difficulty in providing performance linked financial 
bonuses to employees, and this carries over to agencies and crown corporations such as 
the OSC.  Again, this arises from poor accounting. With no measure of the costs and 
benefits of various programs, the bureau itself can fabricate whatever self-serving values 
                                                 
16  A possible motive for the former is to deflect criticism of the Commission and find 
other scapegoats for the market decline and to assuage the responsibility for the poor 
returns of individual investors. The latter suggests that the widely disparate penalties – as 
in the Patterson and Donnini cases – imposed on those that confess and those that 
maintain their innocence is linked to the Commissioners’ willingness to assist staff 
prosecutors  in extracting confessions in future cases. In those cases Patterson received a 
2 year suspension and Donnini a 15 year suspension (for speaking with one another). 
Donnini’s suspension was later reduced to 4 years on appeal to the judicial system, where 
the judge remarked that simply defending oneself is not against the law. 
17  The regularly scheduled meetings of staff and commissioners, to “educate” the latter 
also would lead some to question the objectivity of the Commissioners. This, too, hardly 
reflects the absence of ex partite communication. 
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it chooses. Furthermore, because of the difficulty – or unwillingness – to measure 
outputs, the measures usually settled on generally boil down to being correlated with 
inputs rather than outputs. But this tends to mean that the greater the extent of regulation, 
the greater the value the bureaucracy attributes to itself.  
 
For both institutions and individuals, one obvious fact reins in the appetite to expand, 
namely a budget constraint. Unfortunately, as a crown corporation, the OSC can generate 
its own revenue in a one supplier market. In particular, any revenue from fees, fines, 
and/or settlements above and beyond (a) the costs of operation and (b) designated under 
terms of settlement for allocation to or for the benefit of third parties was to be remitted 
to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. These terms were added to the legislation to remove 
the perception that the OSC “encouraged settlements, not because they were in the public 
interest, but rather to generate additional revenue.”18 If anything, such a revenue structure 
actually encourages the OSC to over regulate.  
 
It has been argued that regulatory competition can lead to better regulation. Nonetheless, 
in Canada this competition is fairly limited. For instance, investors resident in the US 
cannot use Canadian brokers to make their trades and, “in retaliation,” the OSC does not 
permit Ontario residents to use US brokers, so the “competition” de facto takes the form 
of collusion against the principals who “own” the regulatory machinery.  
 
The regulatory competition among the 13 provincial and territorial security commissions 
is also limited. Currently, each regional commission insists that firms operating in their 
area be subject to their specific regulations. A current proposal for reform is the passport 
system where the firm registers in only one province but can operate in all others on the 
basis of that registration.19  All but one of the provincial and territorial security regulators 
have indicated they are in favor of this reform and most view it as a step in the process of 
moving to a single regulator. The holdout is the OSC.20 
 
The Crawford Commission suggestion to study the separation of the prosecutorial and 
judicial functions of the OSC was later followed up by the Osborne report which 
recommended such a separation. The Ontario Standing Committee on Finance and 
Economic Affairs accepted the Osborne report and it is expected to be put into place 
some time in the next year. It is this “independent judiciary” and the greater insistence on 
a relevant accounting system (cost-benefit analysis) that are the Crawford Commission 
cornerstones to provide the greater oversight of the OSC in the coming years. It is worth 
                                                 
18  OSC (2003b), p.219. 
19  Under this proposal, firms would continue to be subject to the local regulations of the 
province(s) in which they operate. 
20  Regulatory competition across institutions but within the same location is a possibility, 
with separate regulators for pension plans, insurance companies and securities markets. It 
remains to be seen if there is or is not competion among them in the case of Capital 
Accumulation Plans (CAPs). If the regulators settle on one set of quantitative restrictions 
for all these institutions instead of  separate rules for each, then what competition there 
was will have been co-opted in favor of regulatory collusion. 
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noting that both are mechanisms that have applied to the private corporate sector since 
long before the establishment of financial regulators in North America.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Corporate and, to an extent, public, governance deals with the institutions, practices and 
regulations that are meant to resolve the principal – agent problem, and to insure that the 
legal rights of third parties are not infringed. In the financial sector governance practices 
have been overseen by a financial regulator for most of the past century. For Ontario, the 
regulator is the OSC which was restructured as a crown corporation in 1997 and has been 
quite active during its recent incarnation, especially in imposing new standards of 
governance for publicly traded corporations.  The fundamental question is how we can 
determine what the best governance practices are. While the evidence is not in on that 
question there are at least two (admittedly extreme) hypotheses that might be used to get 
a handle on the answer. One hypothesis is that the regulations imposed by financial 
market regulators define the minimum necessary conditions for good governance 
practices: If they did not, then the regulations would not have been imposed by a welfare 
maximizing government agency. The second hypothesis is that the governance practices 
of the regulator must be the best practices for governance on the assumption that they 
would want to provide an example of best practices and, in any case, would be inclined to 
use best practices in order to operate most efficiently. I have used the OSC as a case 
study of the differences in policies set for the private sector and used by the regulator 
itself. 
 
One area where regulations have recently been expanded has been the requirement that 
there be certain minimum numbers of independent directors on the board and especially 
on the audit and compensation committees. The OSC Board and its subcommittees are 
composed solely of non-independent directors – the Commissioners themselves. Now it 
may be that the Commissioners are so honorable that they do not need to be monitored by 
an independent set of directors. Or it may be that, indeed, they are imposing unnecessary 
costs on private firms.21  
 
A second area where policy and practice differ is in the enforcement of laws and 
regulations ostensibly to protect both principals and third parties. Such compliance issues 
have become quite expensive for private firms and have often taken the form of a specific 
member of the firm taking on compliance issues full time. These compliance officers 
have a reasonable degree of independence and can go outside the firm to the legal system 
and/or regulatory body to back up their assessments. OSC practices are much less 
transparent. Issues of compliance are handled internally and reported to the 
                                                 
21   These costs are not trivial. In the US where, admittedly, the Sarbanes - Oxley 
legislation goes further than in Canada, the costs for some firms can be substantial. The 
cost to AIG has been estimated at US$300 million and GE estimated theirs to be US$30 
million. For public firms with sales under US$1 billion, the average cost increase has 
been estimated at US$1.6 million. See Bartlett (2004). The NY Times (May 20, 2005) 
reports that between 2001 and 2003 the securities industry lost 8% of its [US] workforce 
whereas those involved in corporate oversight grew 30%. 
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Commissioners themselves. There also appears to be some resistance to making material 
public as required by the freedom of information act. Again there is a substantial conflict 
between policy and practice: Either the regulatory burden applied to the private sector is 
excessive or the Commissioners are headed for sainthood. 
 
An essential element in resolving any principal – agent problem is the ability of the 
principals to have some measure of performance of the agent in achieving its objective. 
For the private sector, a complete system of financial accounts and procedures has been 
developed to satisfy this need for transparency long before financial markets were ever 
subject to financial regulation. Yet financial market regulators continue to demand 
modifications to those systems in an effort to provide greater comparability across firms.  
 
If we look to OSC practice, we find that their accounting system is far inferior to even 
pre regulation accounting for the private sector. This is because the OSC has no 
meaningful measuring mechanism to determine whether or not it is meeting its 
objectives.  To have a meaningful system for the OSC would require that the 
Commission take seriously cost-benefit analysis for each of their policy initiatives and 
conduct post audits to determine if their forecasts were correct. To this point they have 
applied cost-benefit analysis haphazardly and there is no public record of any ex post 
analysis of the net benefits of any regulation.  
 
This absence of proper accounting is likely the major reason we have no good handle on 
what best governance practices might be. Certainly it cannot be more lax than the 
governance procedures used by the OSC itself. Nor could it be as restrictive as current 
regulations require since, in the absence of cost-benefit analysis, there is every incentive 
for a regulatory commission to expand its empire and over regulate.22 In the absence of 
fundamental changes in governance procedures, and most especially a serious effort to 
have meaningful accounting and oversight procedures, there is a real question of the 
legitimacy of such an organization. Institutions that behave contrary to what they insist 
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